If only financial crises were more discriminate in the havoc they wreak. Unfortunately for Germany, the downturn has had scant regard for economic justice: the prudent savers and the hard workers have seen their economies savaged with vigour that is almost indistinguishable from what has been witnessed by the spendaholic Anglo-Saxons. The last 12-18 months have illustrated the full extent of how interconnected financial markets have become, for better or worse. The vulnerability for the Germans

Like other industrialised economies, Germany faces a higher budget deficit in 2009 than it previously did. It finds itself with a financing requirement of €323bn, of which €60bn is intended specifically for stabilising financial markets. Germany continues to pursue its traditional format to financing, but the ability of the government guaranteed agencies to fund is being tested, just as there are calls for them to assume a more prominent economic role. Similarly, the demand for German assets rel

German car maker VW had been at the forefront of the European securitisation market last year. It issued several public and privately placed transactions, with the last public placement – Driver 6 – seen just a week before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In hindsight, the timing of that deal could not have been better for the issuer. At the time, the head of ABS at VW Bank, Stefan Rolf, confirmed that all proceeds of Driver 6 had been placed with third-party investors, with none retained. Loyal

In the first quarter of 2009 German companies signed eight loans for €22.5bn according to Thomson Reuters data. It was a more than respectable showing for a European loan market where volumes have dropped by around a third, making the country the continent's second largest loan market. That said, the amount raised was still modest against the wider capital markets: German entities sold 132 bonds, raising close to €112bn. The figures are indicative of a year where borrowers have focused their fun

Since the introduction of the German Financial Market Stabilization Act in October 2008, it has become clear that certain amendments are needed if it is to achieve its objective of effectively stabilising German financial market institutions. However, the glut of bad news hitting the markets, and the headlines, over the past months has continued to fuel the debate as to whether Germany needs a comprehensive bank rescue plan. Despite the government’s attempts to avoid a general public debate, the

With a total outstanding volume of some €800bn, roughly one fifth of the entire German bond market, the importance of Pfandbriefe, Germany’s highly prized covered bond market, cannot be underestimated. But few asset classes have come out unscathed from the crisis, and despite being widely regarded as the strongest of all covered bonds, Pfandbriefe have been no exception. In the first quarter of this year, only €3.25bn of jumbo Pfandbriefe (excluding taps) were publically issued in the market – a

During the past six months, expectations that new EU-wide disclosure rules for CfDs might be in the pipeline have faded. After Porsche Automobil Holding set in motion plans to raise its stake in Volkswagen and triggered a massive squeeze on short-sellers, industry officials were sure that CfDs would come under greater scrutiny in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. On October 26 2008, Porsche disclosed the extent of its position in VW equity, due to a belief that short positions in the market were

This year promised to be a landmark for German ECM. If all went to plan, it was to start with a high profile privatisation and would be sustained with a steady flow of acquisition-related capital increases. The reality, however, has proved far less impressive. Activity has virtually ground to a halt and some of the regionally-focused German banks are rumoured to be on the point of closing their ECM businesses. In Europe, Germany ranked 10th in terms of issuance volumes during the first quarter o