Highlights of the year in black and white
To see the digital version of this report, please click here
To purchase printed copies or a PDF, please email gloria.balbastro@lseg.com
There are new features available.
View now.
Search
There are new features available.
View now.
Search
To see the digital version of this report, please click here
To purchase printed copies or a PDF, please email gloria.balbastro@lseg.com
Asia’s debt restructuring landscape in 2021 revealed its increasingly dual nature: China, and the rest of the region. South and South-East Asian legal regimes remain challenging although reform is underway, led by India, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines and hope springs that greater transparency and predictability will emerge as markets develop. “Undoubtedly China distressed is perceived as the new frontier for Asian debt restructurings,” said Jamie Mclaughlan, director at advisory firm PJT Partners in Hong Kong. “Over many, many years we will likely see the market evolve and change like the US and EMEA had to over many, many years of case law and successful or unsuccessful attempts at consensual holistic solvent restructurings.” China has become the locus for the big Western restructuring advisory specialists such as Houlihan Lokey and PJT, who tend to focus on offshore debt and ply their trade against the home-grown competition which has traditionally been more DCM-focused.New frontier Big ticket restructurings from China’s real estate sector for the likes of developers China Evergrande Group, Kaisa Group Holdings and Fantasia Holdings, plus the ongoing stress across China’s highly leveraged real estate sector, help explain the idea that the country represents the new frontier for the industry. But other industry segments are likely to form part of China’s restructuring pipeline in the coming years thanks in part to the Covid-19 pandemic, high levels of leverage and cyclical industry downturns. Manufacturing could be the next shoe to drop in the face of soaring energy prices in China. “We’ve seen a meaningful increase in restructuring activity in the region in terms of new mandates and closed deals over the past twelve months. Covid-driven changes in the credit cycle and sector-specific developments such as those in Chinese real estate have been key catalysts for this increase in restructuring activity,” said Brandon Gale, Hong Kong-based head of Houlihan Lokey’s financial restructuring group in Asia. Corporate debt restructuring in Asia has for years existed against an unpredictable legal backdrop, with unfit-for-purpose restructuring laws and often capricious courts. This is most notably the case in Indonesia, where long timelines are the norm, highly paid advisers engage in gamesmanship often involving outrageous tactics and restructurings of restructurings are commonplace. But the ex-China landscape is changing with Singapore a standout benchmark exception in terms of predictable process. Meanwhile, Malaysia India and the Philippines have enacted legal reforms which should transport the region closer to that benchmark. Still, the bad old ways die hard and the restructuring of national carrier Garuda Indonesia is a case in point. A US$10bn debt restructuring is in the works, having commenced on December 9, some 11 years after the company’s last such exercise which was completed in 2010 after five years of tortuous negotiations, and 18 months after the carrier restructured a sukuk. Garuda entered the PKPU process, allowing it to suspend creditor payments as it works out a restructuring plan over a 45-day window or agrees to be wound up, amid accusations of gamesmanship after the first creditors meeting was scheduled on December 21, right before Christmas.Western hedge funds A phenomenon which has been notable over the past few years in Asia is the participation of large US and European funds, which are sitting on piles of cash due to quiet home markets and are willing to deploy them, largely in offshore distressed debt. China has been – and will continue to be – their main target. “With the recent high profile, large cap Chinese real estate distressed names we have seen US and European hedge funds look to play in this space. Many are attracted by the low trading price, typically 20–30 cents and large notional sizes
When India’s Masala bond market was launched in 2014, the hope was that it would become a vibrant issuance arena underpinned by deep secondary liquidity and a wide variety of foreign investors and traders. To say that the market has disappointed would be an understatement, but optimists are calling a turn. The International Finance Corporation opened the Masala market with the announcement of a bond programme in 2013, following severe stress in India’s capital markets as a result of concerns about the country’s budget deficit and the “taper tantrum” prompted by the US Federal Reserve’s announcement that it was reducing its quantitative easing programme. The ensuing capital flight spurred a nosedive of the rupee and, against a backdrop of panic, the IFC and the Indian government discussed measures to deepen the rupee capital markets. The Masala market was one result. The received opinion at the time was that India had finally decided to internationalise the rupee, and that the Masala market would follow the example of China’s hugely successful Dim Sum bond market – which grew around 100-fold over a few years from its inception in 2007 as China internationalised the renminbi. Coupons and redemption on Masala bonds are received in the settlement currency and tied to the rupee exchange rate. A US$1bn offshore bond programme was duly established in October 2013 under which the IFC would issue rupees to offshore investors – with settlement in US dollars and pegged to the rupee/dollar exchange rate – and repatriate the funds to India for investment onshore, principally in infrastructure projects. Starting in 2014, IFC subsequently issued Masala bonds at tenors of three, five, seven, 10 and 15 years, with the programme increased to US$3bn in 2016. For Masala optimists the potential of the market was demonstrated that year through two events. First, when the IFC brought the first green Masala bond, with proceeds used to support a green bond issued by Yes Bank, and then when it opened the Uridashi Masala market by tapping Japan’s retail investor base with all payments settled in yen, albeit in a diminutive US$4.3m-equivalent issue size. But that attraction also underpins complaints about the Masala market and indeed the other offshore domestic currency bond markets such as Dim Sum, and international Philippine peso bonds: that issuance represents essentially a call on the currency by the investor rather than a relative yield play. For investors who fully hedge the rupee exposure, the return is lower than could be achieved through buying the same credit in the offshore US dollar bond markets, where liquidity is higher, with the cost of forward hedging thought to be as much as 6%.Crimping development “The basic fact is that non-domestic investors who are looking at getting credit exposure to India prefer to obtain that in the dollar bond market or by investing in Indian government paper for reasons of liquidity. Masala bonds have demonstrated poor liquidity and that has crimped the development of the market,” said Sameer Gupta, head of Indian DCM at Deutsche Bank in Mumbai. As well as the IFC, the Asian Development Bank, Asia’s oldest multilateral development bank, has also served as a Masala bond pioneer, bringing its first Masala bond in 2014 – a Rs3bn (US$49.6m at the time) two-year – and with the exception of 2015 and 2018 has issued every year since, extending its Masala curve steadily out to four, five and 10 years. “None of ADB’s Masala bonds have been swapped out. We retain all the proceeds in rupees for our local currency loans and investments,” said Jonathan Grosvenor, assistant treasurer at the ADB in Manila. “This borrowing programme – Rs81.2bn to date – has been an enormous success story for ADB since it has catalysed important growth in our local currency lending, which results in more developme
It’s all change at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, or at least it will be on April 4. But opinion is divided about whether the planned upheaval will do enough to inject new life into one of the duller corners of the world’s equity markets. Japan Exchange Group, which was formed in 2013 through the merger of Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange, is to simplify the TSE, cutting the five market sectors to three. The current First, Second, and Mothers sections and the two sub-sections of Jasdaq will be split into Prime, Standard and Growth. As part of the transition, JPX has tightened its listing requirements, established minimum levels of capitalisation, increased the number of tradeable shares, addressed cross-shareholding issues, tidied up the composition of the indices and enhanced the quality of corporate governance. Although the move has been almost universally welcomed, opinion is divided as to whether the changes go far enough to fundamentally change international investor perception of corporate Japan. Some think JPX has missed an opportunity to make a real difference, while others are more sanguine about the pace of change. “It’s quite subjective. Some think it’s not going to change anything, but I think it should be seen as another incremental step towards a better standard of corporate governance in Japan,” said Alex Lee, a global equities portfolio manager at Columbia Threadneedle Investments. What is widely accepted is that the structure of Japan’s cash equity market is ambiguous and needed rationalising. “As with anything in Japan, things tend to be quite slow in terms of reorganisation,” said Michael Wu, a senior equity analyst at Morningstar. “It has been a long wait for the boards to be restructured, something that should have happened a while ago. It will, at least, bring some clarity for companies and for investors.” Legacy boards The ambiguity stems from the merger of the two exchanges when TSE became the venue for cash equities and OSE the place for derivatives trading. “At the time of the merger, the respective stock exchange classifications were kept unchanged under the cash equity TSE umbrella, so that investors and listed companies would not be confused as to where they belonged,” said Ayla Wagatsuma, manager of the TSE. But the resulting five segments “became too much for investors as there was little difference between Jasdaq Growth and Mothers,” she said. There were also concerns that the market concept of the Second section, Mothers, and Jasdaq overlapped. It was important for JPX to clarify the areas of confusion not just for the sake of investors and companies, but also for the long-term revenue generation prospects of the exchange itself. “The primary objective of an exchange is to provide liquidity,” said Koichi Niwa, an analyst at Citigroup. “For that, it needs to attract enterprising, growing companies and it needs to provide a good trading platform. Liquidity is key to TSE as over 60% of its revenue comes from trading commissions and clearing fees.” A review of the market’s classifications started in 2018 with a public consultation to uncover concerns from investors and companies. The review determined there were insufficient incentives for listed companies to increase corporate value, and that Topix was not functioning as an efficient investment tool – the benchmark referenced all the companies listed on the First section, which at more than 2,000 was too many for effective engagement. A lack of liquidity in the underlying shares was also an obstacle to its value as a benchmark. “The implications of the review were so huge that the venue of discussion passed up to the Japan’s Financial Services Agency,” said Wagatsuma. “It came up with a final report in December 2019. And once we had the proposal, we started building the rules.” A c
To see the digital version of this report, please click here To purchase printed copies or a PDF, please email gloria.balbastro@lseg.com
To see the digital version of this report, please click here To purchase printed copies or a PDF, please email gloria.balbastro@lseg.com
Admiralty Harbour Where offshore vehicles dock after hitting the rocks AI-powered Fair marketing claim, as long as your business uses computers Archegos Proof that being banned from trading in Hong Kong doesn’t have to limit your career Beijing Stock Exchange Niche market for issuers that weren’t quite right for the four existing boards in Shanghai and Shenzhen Bond buyback Attempt by an issuer to reassure investors that its US$50bn of debt is manageable by repurchasing US$10m of paper in the secondary market Carrie trade Going all-in on China China-to-US listing Critically endangered species Coffee break When supply chain problems keep M&S from restocking espresso Common prosperity A national movement to depress stock prices Cool wall Where bankers pin the tech deals that traded up Cyberspace Virtual territory now regulated by China Didi Expensive ride-hailing service that takes you right back to your starting point Dim Sum A dish served mainly by the Chinese government EV Excessive valuations Evergrande Never that grand Exchange offer In the Chinese high-yield sector, a generous offer for existing bondholders to accept either new paper or a 10% recovery rate in bankruptcy Fantasia New f-word for bond investors Fintech start-up Job scheme for out-of-favour bankers Grab To seize the top of the market Grace period Thirty-day loan Greensill Financing company that invented future receivables, where money was raised based on transactions that might never happen, and due diligence that seemingly didn’t Homecoming A ceremony welcoming back former members of the community, often involving a game of political football Hybrid work 1. Splitting time between the home and office; 2. Trying to make a subordinated perpetual bond qualify for equity accounting treatment even though the issuer is going to redeem it in five years Kaisa To default once is unfortunate, twice is careless Libor transition Banking’s even less eventful version of the Y2K bug NFTs (non-fungible tokens) A digital Rolex for Millennials Paytm A digital payments system that takes money out of the pockets of shareholders Penny’s Bay Resort where Hong Kong’s bankers spend their block leave Pride Something that diversity-friendly investment banks suppress when it comes to certain countries in Asia Quarantine Applicable to all visitors to Hong Kong, apart from chairmen of economically significant banks and the lady who played Aquaman’s mum Refinancing wall Signature structure of many Chinese property developers Second-party opinion Sought by senior government figures worried that holding drinks events during lockdown might be a bad idea SPAC Outmoded US fashion looking for a second life in Asia Sustainability-linked The weakest link for ESG investors US blacklist a.k.a. Hong Kong IPO pipeline VIE Surprisingly resilient legal sandcastle Zero Covid policy A deflationary strategy Zoom A roadshow with no golf or shopping To see the digital version of this report, please click here To purchase printed copies or a PDF, please email gloria.balbastro@lseg.com
All websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.